Subsidiary Alliance - The Poisoned Chalice - How the Nizam won and lost Berar
Pankaj Sethi
Subsidiary Alliance was a strategy crafted by colonial powers in the subcontinent to control native states without having to fight them. The concept was pioneered by the French East India Company Governor General Marquis Joseph Francois Dupleix in the 1740s. It was refined by the British East India Company under Governor General Lord Wellesley, who gave the concept its final form fifty years later.
History records the unqualified success that the concept delivered for the British. This is vividly illustrated by the fate of Berar, a part of the dominions of the Nizams of Hyderabad, after the Nizams became the first native ruler to sign a structured Subsidiary Alliance treaty with the East India Company.
Berar in the Nizam’s title
When the last Nizam Mir Osman Ali ascended the masnad in 1911 he was referred to as the “Nizam of Hyderabad”. His ancestors had also held this title. By the time the British left in 1947 Osman Ali was addressed as the “Nizam of Hyderabad and Berar”.
Despite the addition of Berar to his title however, the victory was pyrrhic. The British did not return Berar to him.
Thereby hangs a tale. A tale of frustration, desperation, pretences, treaties and realpolitik. A tale with a cast of kings, generals, bankers and ministers. A tale in which the once supreme “Subedar of the Deccan”, to whom the East India Company paid tribute, was reduced to pleading with the British for his territory.
But what is Berar? How did the Nizam gain it? And how did he lose it?
Berar is a region in Central India, roughly corresponding to Amravati Division of today’s Maharashtra. It includes Amravati, Akola, Buldana, Washim and Yavatmal districts. The Satpura range forms Berar’s northern border and the Ajanta range runs through its middle. Tapti, Purna, Pranhita, Wardha and Penganga rivers drain it. The fertile black soil is suitable for growing cash crops like cotton and oilseeds. For long the region was known as “Varhad”. The dialect spoken there is still called Varhadi Marathi. The name “Berar” (or Birad - बिराड़) is a corruption of “Varhad”.
Berar had once been under the Nizams. But its control had passed to the British. In 1926 Nizam Osman Ali, citing treaties and arrangements between his ancestors and the British, asked Viceroy Lord Reading for the return of Berar. Reading rudely refused, famously saying "the sovereignty of the British Crown over the Native States arises not only from treaty rights but exists independently of them, and no State can hope to negotiate on terms of equality with the Paramount Power."
5 years later the situation had changed. Political unrest due to the Congress-led freedom movement put the British under pressure. The Viceroy Lord Willingdon wanted the support of the Native Princes against Congress’s push for independence. The Nizam thought it was the right time to again raise the issue of return of Berar.
It took time but the Nizam’s efforts did bear some fruit. In 1936 Viceroy Lord Linlithgow agreed that the Nizam would henceforth be also known as “Prince of Berar”. And in 1941 the British agreed to give him the title “Nizam of Hyderabad and Berar”.
But the territory of Berar remained with the British. They did not return it to the Nizam.
Genesis of the Berar issue
The first independent Sultanate in the Deccan was the Bahmani Sultanate. It was set up in 1347 by Alauddin Bahman Shah with its capital in Gulbarga. Berar was one of the five provinces of this Sultanate.
Over the next 280 years Berar changed hands several times. In 1490 Governor of Berar Imad-ul-mulk declared independence from the now weak Bahmani king, and founded the Imad Shahi Dynasty with its capital at Ellichpur. In 1574 Berar came under the Nizam Shahis of Ahmednagar. 12 years later Chand Bibi, Regent for the minor king, was forced to cede Berar to Mughal Emperor Akbar. Malik Ambar recovered it from the Mughals 15 years later but Shah Jahan again won it back in 1628.
Under Aurangzeb the Mughal Empire expanded to its greatest extent. He spent a major part of his life in the Deccan, where he conquered Bijapur in 1686 and Golconda the next year. When he died in 1707 the Empire had 23 subahs (provinces). Berar was one of them.
But the fall in Mughal fortunes was swift. Aurangzeb’s successors were weak and there was intrigue and infighting after him. The stage was set for fragmentation of the Empire.
One of Aurangzeb’s trusted companions and generals in his Deccan campaigns had been Mir Qamaruddin Khan Siddiqui. During the post-Aurangzeb turmoil in Delhi Mir Qamaruddin was given the title Asaf Jah, and made “Nizam-ul-mulk” of the Deccan subahs of Aurangabad, Berar, Bijapur, Bidar and Golconda (Hyderabad) in 1724. Though nominally the representative of the Mughal Emperor in the Deccan he was independent of Delhi for most practical purposes. The Asaf Jahi Dynasty founded by him would rule Hyderabad till 1948.
When Mir Qamarauddin took over as Nizam the other major power in the Deccan were the Marathas. Weakening of Mughal central authority meant that though Berar was nominally under the Nizam the Maratha Bhonsle Rajas of Nagpur also laid claim to it. For several decades there was strife between the Nizam and the Bhonsles over Berar.
Meanwhile momentous events were also happening elsewhere in India due to the weakening of the Mughals. Two of these were of special relevance to the Nizam.
The first development happened south of Hyderabad. Adjoining the Nizam’s territories was Mysore. It had been ruled by the Wodeyar rajahs. Hyder Ali, the army chief under Krishnaraj Wodeyar II first became the Chief Minister and then the de facto ruler of Mysore in 1761. He and his son Tipu built up Mysore into a formidable power. Inevitably there were clashes between Mysore and Hyderabad. The Nizam now had a second powerful foe to worry about in addition to the Marathas.
The second development affecting the Nizam was the rise of the British East India Company. In 1757 the Company’s forces under Robert Clive had defeated Siraj-ud-daula, Nawab of Bengal, at Plassey. 7 years later the Company won an even bigger victory when they defeated the combined forces of Bengal, Awadh, and Mughal Emperor Shah Alam II, in the Battle of Buxar. The Treaty of Allahabad between Clive and Mughal Emperor Shah Alam in 1765 gave the Diwani of Bengal to the Company. Another Treaty with Nawab Shuja-ud-daula of Awadh forced the Nawab to not only pay reparations to the Company but also handed over Awadh’s military defence to the Company.
With these victories the Company became the dominant force in north India. It now wanted to expand southward. For this it wanted to link its base of Fort William in Calcutta with Fort St George in Madras. But between these two lay the Nizam’s territories. Qamaruddin Siddiqui had passed away and Ali Khan was now the Nizam. The Company could fight him to gain the required territory. Instead, wary of the strength of “Nizam-ul-mulk, Subedar of the Deccan”, it chose another strategy.
Subsidiary Alliance – the poisoned chalice
The alternative strategy crafted by the Company to subdue a native state was to enter into “Subsidiary Alliance” with the state rather than fighting it. It had tried parts of this strategy in its Treaty with the Nawab of Awadh. The strategy was nurtured by Governor General Lord Cornwallis in the 1780s, and reached fruition a decade later under Lord Wellesley.
The idea was simple. The Company would sign a Treaty with the native state by which it would place a military force in the state to protect the state against “common enemies”. The expense of this force would be borne by the native state via a “subsidy” paid to the Company - hence the name “Subsidiary Alliance”.
Variations of this scheme included having the ruler of the native state cede a part of his territory to the Company if he was unable to pay the subsidy, or requiring the native rulers to also provide their troops in aid of the Company during the Company’s wars.
On the face of it this was an unequal arrangement, loaded against the native state. The Company gained military presence in the native state and neutralised any military threat from it. It could keep watch on the state’s affairs and even interfere in matters such as succession and in the state’s relationship with other states. It gained all these advantages at the native state’s expense.
The only benefit to the native ruler was that he avoided wars with the Company and had a military ally in case of a war with another native state.
Why would a native ruler agree to such an unequal arrangement? Obviously he had to be militarily or financially weak, or afraid of the Company’s power.
Subsidiary Alliance with the Nizam
To link Fort William with Fort St George the Company needed certain coastal districts whiach lay in the Nizam’s territory. It requested the Nizam for these districts. In return the Company offered to pay financial tribute (peshkash) to the Nizam, or, alternatively, make its troops available to the Nizam against enemies (if such troops happened to be free when the Nizam needed them).
This arrangement was finalised in the 1766 “Treaty of Friendship and Alliance” between East India Company and Nizam Ali Khan. The Treaty envisaged that Nizam would hand over the circars (districts) of Ellore (Eluru), Chicaole (Kakinada), Rajamundry, Mustaphanuggur (Kondapalli) and Murtazanuggur (Guntur) – collectively called the Northern Circars - to the Company. In return the Nizam could ask for Company troops for use against common enemies and the Company would be bound to provide these troops to the Nizam if they were free and available. If there was no requirement of Company troops in any year the Company would pay 9 lakh rupees to the Nizam that year.
The amount of peshkash fixed was equal to the revenue the Nizam obtained from these circars. So he would continue to get the revenue he was getting earlier. He would forego this revenue only in the year that he needed Company troops for his purposes. The arrangement seemed fair. It seemed to be a Treaty among equals.
But this would soon change!
In the next couple of decades the Company was able to make inroads in the south by getting into arrangements with Arcot, Travancore and Tanjore. It tried a similar approach with Mysore but did not succeed. Hyder Ali and Tipu refused any “arrangement” with the Company. There were two wars between Mysore and the Company - in 1767 and 1780. By 1789 a third Anglo-Mysore War was imminent.
Lord Cornwallis was now the Governor General. He found that despite the 1766 Treaty the Nizam had still not handed over Guntur circar to the Company. The Company needed Guntur for logistical reasons including troop movements between Calcutta and Madras. By now the power dynamics between the Company and the Nizam had changed. The Company, flush with successes in both south and north, had gained in power and resources. The Nizam had been weakened, not least by his constant battles with the Marathas and with Mysore.
Cornwallis wrote a strong letter to the Nizam, remonstrating that the Nizam had not upheld his side of the deal. He asked for Guntur to be handed over immediately. He admitted that the Company had also been lax in paying peshkash and promised that this would be rectified. Crucially, he offered to dilute the clause about Company troops being made available to the Nizam only if they were free from other battles. He now offered that two battalions of Company troops would be made available whenever the Nizam asked for them. He also offered that if Nizam requested the Company’s troops the Company would charge the Nizam not the entire peshkash for that year, but only the actual expense on the troops.
To a weakened Nizam these promises seemed fair. He wanted Company troops available to him. He handed over Guntur to the Company.
This status continued for another ten years. However just before the fourth Anglo-Mysore War in 1798, the Company, now under Lord Wellesley, proposed a “Perpetual Subsidiary Treaty” to the Nizam. This Treaty had provision for permanently stationing 6,000 Company troops in Hyderabad at a cost of Rs 24,17,100 per year to be paid by the Nizam, in four equal instalments. The Treaty also had a provision that the Nizam would provide his troops to the Company when required for battles against common enemies.
The Nizam was weak after constant wars with the Marathas. He also wanted to eliminate the Mysore threat for ever. He agreed to sign the Treaty.
From a position where the Company had committed to providing him troops whenever he wanted them, the Nizam was reduced to hosting a permanent “Subsidiary Force” in his territory. He would still get the Guntur peshkash, but 9 lakhs per annum was obviously insufficient to match the 24 lakhs per annum he had agreed to pay for the “Subsidiary Force”.
The combined forces of the Company and the Nizam defeated Tipu at Seringapatnam. Tipu was killed.
A “Partition Treaty of Mysore” was signed between the Company and the Nizam in 1799 to divide Tipu’s territories among themselves. The Nizam got Mysore’s Gooty province, which adjoined his territories south of the Krishna River.
For the East India Company this was a major achievement. It had killed two birds with one stone. The Nizam was now an ally and the powerful Tipu’s southern territories now belonged to the Company.
But what about the Nizam? Almost immediately he found himself unable to pay Rs 24 lakhs per annum for the “Subsidiary Force” imposed by the 1798 Treaty. So in 1800 he agreed to sign another Treaty in which he ceded all his territorial gains from the Mysore War to the Company in return for extinguishing his liability to pay the expenses of the Subsidiary Force. He also agreed to increasing the strength of the Subsidiary Force to 8,000 from 6,000.
What a fall!
Yes, he had one less enemy in Tipu. But he was left with no additional territory from the Mysore War. From a sovereign who was collecting tribute from the Company he had gone to being a ruler stuck with 8,000 armed Company troops on his soil
The utility of the Subsidiary Alliance for the British had been dramatically demonstrated!
The effect of Subsidiary Alliance on Berar
To be fair the Nizam did derive some preliminary benefit in Berar from the Subsidiary Alliance.
In addition to Mysore the Company had also been fighting the Marathas. The first Anglo Maratha war lasted from 1775-1782. After defeating Tipu the joint armies of the Nizam and the Company fought the second Anglo-Maratha War from 1803-1805.
In 1803 these joint forces defeated the Rajah of Berar and also the Holkar Maharaja Daulat Rao Scindia. The Treaty of Deogaum signed between the Company and the Rajah of Berar on 17 December 1803, and the Treaty of Sarjee Anjengaum signed between the Company and Daulat Rao Scindia on 30 December 1803, saw the two Maratha rulers cede several parts of their territories to the victors.
These territories were divided between the Company and the new Nizam Secunder Jah through a Treaty in April 1804 (Nizam Ali Khan had passed away the previous year). The Nizam finally got Berar. Subsidiary Alliance with the Company made him not just Berar’s nominal ruler but also its real ruler. The revenue from Berar now belonged to him. And though he was left with nothing from the Mysore War at least he did not owe the British any money.
But Fate took another turn, and the Subsidiary Alliance Treaty soon came back to haunt the Nizam.
“Hyderabad Contingent”
The Treaty of 1798 had obliged the Nizam to provide his troops to fight along with Company troops against common enemies. The Nizam had indeed supplied troops to fight the second Anglo-Maratha War.
But Henry Russell, who took over as the Company’s Resident in Hyderabad in 1811, was not satisfied with the quality of Nizam’s troops. Russell claimed that Nizam’s troops were poorly paid, poorly trained, and had low morale. This was not the quality of troops that the Company had expected from the Nizam when it signed the 1798 Treaty.
Russell proposed that Nizam’s obligation under the Treaty could be fulfilled if he (Russell) raised a professional, new body of troops trained by the Company to its own standards. This contingent of troops would be treated as the troops that Nizam was to provide under the Treaty. To ensure that the troops were paid promptly and regularly, their salaries would be paid by the Company. But since it was actually the Nizam’s obligation to pay for these troops, the Nizam would reimburse these expenses to the Company!
Russell’s evaluation of the morale, pay and training of Nizam’s troops may have been accurate. Nevertheless a more assured sovereign would have refused to countenance a substantial new recurring expense being imposed on him and would probably have found another way to tackle his troop’s shortcomings. But Secunder Jah capitulated to Russell’s demand.
So Russell’s Brigade, later called Hyderabad Contingent, came into being.
Starting around 1800, a new town – Secunderabad, had come up 10 km north of Hyderabad to house the 8,000 troops of the Subsidiary Force which the Company had provided under the Treaty of 1798.
But since Hyderabad Contingent were ostensibly Nizam’s troops and not the Company’s, Russell wanted to keep them separate from the Subsidiary Force. The Nizam allotted a new cantonment – Bolarum – a further 10 km north of Secunderabad, to house the Hyderabad Contingent.
Russell used the Hyderabad Contingent to protect Berar. On paper the Contingent was the Nizam’s force. In reality it soon became a body which the Nizam could not use without the Resident’s permission!
And now a new financial reality confronted the Nizam. He had to pay not only his regular army, but also reimburse the Hyderabad Contingent’s expenses to the Company.
The Nizam may have been personally wealthy, but his State’s finances were in poor shape. The darbar’s structure also meant that responsibility for payments was that of ministers and officials, with the Nizam holding an “exalted” status where mundane matters such as making payments to the Company were not his job.
So Russell found himself dealing mainly with the Nizam’s ministers. Munir-ul-mulk was Nizam Secunder Jah’s Diwan from 1809-1833. But it was his deputy, Raja Chandulal, who wielded the actual power. In fact he was so powerful that the British simply called him “the Minister”.
Since the job entrusted to the Hyderabad Contingent was to defend Berar an arrangement was made to pay for it from the revenues of Berar. Raja Chandulal’s brother Govind Bakhsh had been appointed Berar’s Governor in 1804. He was told to ensure payments to the Company out of Berar’s revenue. But by 1816 the arrangement had failed and Nizam’s government fell behind in payments to the Company for the Hyderabad Contingent.
To pay for the Subsidiary Force of Company troops the Nizam had to cede the territories he won from Mysore. But how was he to pay for “his own” Hyderabad Contingent?
Enter the sahukars
The Treaty of 1798 had stipulated that no duties were to be charged by the Nizam’s government on goods meant for the troops of the Company’s subsidiary force. This meant that Secunderabad, the new town which now housed the Subsidiary Force, was in effect a “duty-free” port. This attracted businessmen and workers from all over India, who came to make their fortunes in a town which had just come into being and required all sorts of goods and services. Among the migrants were several wealthy bankers from Parsi, Gujarati and Marwari communities. Many of them also started lending to the Nizam and his Nobles.
One such banking company was Palmer and Company. William Palmer was a Eurasian - son of General William Palmer and Faiz-un-nisa Begum of the ruling family of Awadh. He set up the firm in partnership with Gujarati sahukar (moneylender and banker) Benkati Das.
Palmer had been born in Lucknow and educated in England. He arrived in Hyderabad as a military officer and had commanded the Nizam’s cavalry in the 1803 Anglo-Maratha war which annexed Berar. By 1810 he had risen to Brigadier General in the Nizam’s Bodyguard.
He started lending money in 1808 by placing his money with local Gujarati banker Benkati Das. In 1810 Palmer left service, and started a bank in partnership with Benkati Das. The firm expanded rapidly. It took money from investors (included the British) at 12% interest. The firm dealt in bills of exchange, company bills and loans.
The British Parliament had passed a law in 1797 forbidding loans by British citizens to Indian princes. In 1816 Palmer applied for an exemption to this Law. Lord Hastings was the Governor General. He consulted the Advocate General, and granted the exemption. Hastings’ decision may have been influenced by the fact that by then Palmer and Company had taken on another partner, William Rumbold, who was a ward of Hastings’.
An exemption was also granted from another Act which prohibited interest rates of more than 12% per annum. This exemption was given on the grounds that that law only applied to British territories and Hyderabad was not British territory.
Gradually Palmer and Company started lending money to nobles, and then to the Nizam’s government itself through Raja Chandulal. It charged interest at the rate of 2% per month, which was in line with the rates charged by other firms in view of the poor legal system in Hyderabad. The loans it gave to the Nizam’s government were guaranteed by the revenue of specified districts.
The first major loan by Palmer and Company to the Nizam was in 1818, to pay the salaries of the Hyderabad Contingent stationed in Berar. Palmer, having been involved in the Berar campaign himself, was sympathetic to this requirement of the Nizam. This loan was followed by other loans to Raja Chandulal.
All these loans to ministers of the Nizam’s government drew attention in Calcutta. There were objections by some members of the Court of Directors of East India Company. Records were demanded from Palmer and Company. Demands were made for the Company to interfere in Hyderabad. For his inability to pay his dues the Nizam was called an imbecile and perverse. Matters escalated as the loans to the Nizam approached a crore of rupees.
Finally, in 1820, the exemption granted to Palmer and Company from the Act prohibiting loans to native Princes was withdrawn. But by this time Palmer and Company had lent another sixty lakh rupees to the Nizam. Palmer and Company was bankrupted and liquidated.
The issue had become a big scandal all over India. Henry Russell resigned as the Resident. His replacement Charles Metcalfe hounded William Palmer. The Nizam was drawn into the imbroglio. Owing more than a crore of rupees by then, he finally reached a settlement in 1824 with the Company. The quid pro quo? To settle his dues to the Company he had to permanently forego the peshkash which the Company had been paying to him for the Northern Circars. Subsidiary Alliance with the Company had again hit him hard!
But his troubles were not over. Future dues for the Hyderabad Contingent still had to be paid. Other bankers stepped in – including the Parsi banker Pestonji and Marwari banker Puranmal. Still, by 1840s, the East India Company had once again become a creditor to the Nizam. The Nizam made some payments. But by 1850 the situation seemed to be reaching a point of no return.
Passing of Berar to the British
As matters reached a head Governor General Lord Dalhousie appointed Col James Low as the Company’s Resident in Hyderabad. He was to convey to Nizam Nasir-ud-daulah (Secunder Jah’s successor) that the Nizam’s dues on account of Hyderabad Contingent could not be allowed to continue.
On 12th March 1853 Low went to the Durbar to present his credentials to the Nizam. After the ceremonial presentation of credentials Low and the Nizam retired to a private chamber. Low reminded the Nizam that more than Rs 45 lakhs were now overdue from the Nizam to the Company towards reimbursement of pay for the Hyderabad Contingent. Certain annual allowances to be paid by the Nizam to erstwhile chieftains in the Berar region of the state were also overdue. The Nizam not only needed to clear these past dues but also ensure that these recurring expenses (amounting to Rs 3 lakhs per month) would be paid in future too. He told the Nizam that he would find it difficult to meet this onerous burden.
Low then offered Dalhousie’s alternative proposal to the Nizam. If he were willing to hand over a part of his territory to the Company - a part whose revenue yield was approximately Rs 35 lakhs per year – the Company would write off the past dues of the Nizam, and also bear all future liabilities. Low’s predecessor James Fraser had even worked out which of Nizam’s territories could fit the bill. By his calculations the regions of Berar and the Nizam’s territory in the Raichur Doab (the region between the Krishna and Tungabhadra), would fit the bill as they had combined annual revenues of approximately Rs 35 lakhs.
The Nizam, of course, protested. He blamed irregularity in payments on the Diwan. Low retorted that the Diwan was the Nizam’s officer, and therefore his responsibility. The Nizam then said something which Low had not been expecting. In Low’s own words the Nizam said:
"In the time of my father the Peshwa of Poona became hostile both to the Company's Government and to this Government, and Sahib Jung (meaning Sir Henry Russell) organised this contingent, and sent it in different directions, along with the Company's troops, to fight the Mahratta people; and this was all very proper, and according to the treaty, for those Mahrattas were enemies of both States; and the Company's army and my father's army conquered the ruler of Poona, and you sent him off a prisoner to Hindoosthan, and took the country of Poona. After that there was no longer any war; so why was the contingent kept up any longer than the war?"
Low was surprised because this was the first time the Nizam had questioned the continued need for the “Hyderabad Contingent”. Despite his financial problems he had so far steadfastly refused any suggestion to reduce the strength of the Contingent.
But it appeared that this was just a passing thought of the Nizam. Shortly afterwards the Nizam again reiterated that the strength of the Contingent would not be reduced. He assured Low that he would send officers to discuss arrangements for clearing past dues and ensuring regularity in future payments.
Over the next few weeks there were several meetings between Low and the Nizam’s officers and representatives. But, as in the past, Nizam’s officers would promise something and then go back on it.
It became clear to Low that the Nizam considered it an insult and a betrayal of his legacy if he were to part with even an inch of his territory. At the same time he was not going to agree to a reduction in the strength of the Contingent, or its winding up. Both were matters of pride for him. He seemed to be aghast that the Company would not believe his assurances about clearing the dues and making satisfactory arrangements for future!
For some time a proposal from the Nizam seemed workable. The Nizam had sent a senior Noble, Shams-ul-Umrah. Shams-ul-Umrah told Low that the Nizam had suggested that instead of transferring territory to the Company, he would transfer territory yielding Rs 40 lakhs per annum to Shams-ul-Umrah and revenue from that property would be routed to the Company through the Nizam’s government. Shams-ul-Umrah also told Low that he did not want the permanent hassle of dealing with Nizam’s bureaucracy and had told the Nizam that the territory should be entirely transferred to him and he would directly deal with the Company. The Nizam balked at this. Low suggested that territory could be handed over to the joint control of the Resident and Shams-ul-Umrah. But the Nizam angrily refused to hand over any territory to the British.
So the die was cast. The Nizam could not pay up. And the Company would not relent. Something had to give. The Nizam had to wind up the Hyderabad Contingent. Or he had to give up territory.
The Nizam broke. On 21st May 1853 he signed a Treaty giving up Berar and the Raichur Doab to the British. Technically, he only “assigned” them to the British, on condition that the British would render an annual account of the territories and pay any surplus revenue over the expenses of the Hyderabad Contingent to the Nizam.
But in 1860, after the British Crown took over from the East India Company, Nizam Nasir-ud-daulah’s successor Afzal-ud-daulah, was forced to sign a supplemental Treaty in which he gave up even the demand for annual accounts!
In 1902 the Hyderabad Contingent was finally abolished, and merged with the British Indian Army. At least now Berar should have been restored to the Nizam. But it remained with the British. In 1905 another agreement was signed between the British Crown and the Nizam to “permanently lease” Berar to the British on payment of annual rent of Rs 25 lakhs to the Nizam. The British were free to administer it as they pleased.
Till 1947, when the British left India, the subsequent Nizams kept demanding that Berar be returned to them. They got the 25 lakhs per annum. But Berar stayed with the British, and was administered by the Governor of Central Provinces.
The legacy of Subsidiary Alliances
With the Subsidiary Alliance system the British were able to construct an arrangement whereby the native state paid for its own decimation.
After signing its first structured Subsidiary Alliance Treaty with the Nizam of Hyderabad the East India Company signed several more such treaties with other native rulers. Such treaties allowed the Company to place their troops and Residents in native states. It allowed them to interfere in the Darbar, in the external and internal affairs of the state, and even in deciding who would succeed a deceased ruler. It allowed them to keep shadows of the freedom movement (that started roiling British India after 1857) away from native states. And it allowed them to become the “Paramount Power” without whose concurrence native rulers could not take any substantive decisions.
At the time the British left India in 1947 there were more than 500 “princely states”. Almost all had such alliances with the British.
But when the largest of the native states – Hyderabad – had to suffer the fate it did, is it any surprise that few other states could avoid it?
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References:
- A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads Relating to India and the Neighbouring Countries Vol IX – Compiled by Autchison C.U - 1929
- The Nizam – His History and Relations with the British Government Vol. 1 and 2 – Briggs, H.G -1861
- Palmer and Company: an Indian Banking Firm in Hyderabad State – Leonard, Karen - 2013
- Berar - V.P.K Nambiar - Triveni Journal - Wisdom Library
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